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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We use the exogenous assignment of Army personnel to duty locations to analyze the 
relationship between the characteristics of local markets and the propensity for 
consumers to be subjected to racial discrimination in their everyday commercial 
transactions.  Overall, one in ten soldiers report that they or their families have 
experienced racial discrimination in finding non-government housing or in patronizing 
businesses in their local communities.  Discrimination is related to a community’s 
demographic profile with white and Asian soldiers feeling more unwelcome in local 
businesses as the local population becomes heavily weighted towards other groups.  
Moreover, there is evidence that increased economic vulnerability in the community 
results in more housing discrimination amongst minorities.  While the evidence that 
increased competition reduces consumer market discrimination is mixed, it is clear that 
discrimination is related to the nature of a soldier’s interaction with the local community. 
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1.   Introduction 
Economists have historically had a great deal to say about the causes and consequences of racial 
and gender discrimination in employment, however, the impact of discrimination on other 
economic interactions—in particular those taking place in consumer markets—remains relatively 
unstudied.  Anecdotal evidence would suggest, however, that discriminatory treatment in 
everyday market transactions is a fact of life for many U.S. consumers who find themselves 
being unable to obtain (or paying higher prices for) the goods and services they wish to purchase.  
Consumer market discrimination is insidious because it limits access to fundamental goods and 
services, contributes to disparities in wealth by raising prices and search costs, diminishes 
individuals’ economic and psychological well-being, and perpetuates inequities within society 
more generally. 
Very little systematic evidence exists regarding the extent of discrimination in 
commercial transactions in most consumer markets (see Siegleman, 1998; Yinger, 1998a).  Audit 
studies—in which matched pairs of “testers” engage in market transactions—have been used to 
document the existence of disparate treatment in the markets for housing and automobiles, 
however.  The results suggest that blacks and Hispanics seeking to rent or buy their own homes 
are informed about fewer opportunities, are more often excluded from existing opportunities, and 
generally face higher housing search costs than other individuals (Page, 1995; Roychoudhury 
and Goodman, 1992, 1996; Yinger, 1986, 1997; Choi et al., 2005; and Ondrich et al., 1999).  
Audit studies have also shown that women and blacks often face higher prices for new cars than 
do corresponding white men (Ayres, 1991; 1995; Ayres and Siegleman, 1995).1   
                                                 
1 Using Consumer Expenditure Survey data, Goldberg (1996) finds, however, that disparity in dealer discounts is 
due to car attributes and the nature of the transaction rather than buyer characteristics. 
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Audit studies are powerful because they allow researchers to “match” pairs of testers on a 
number of observable characteristics (say, age, education, location) so that the unbiased effect of 
other characteristics (for example, race or gender) on various commercial transactions can be 
estimated.  Training is used to reduce any potential bias resulting from differences between 
testers in hard-to-match characteristics like personality (see Yinger, 1986).  In this way, audit 
studies are like regression-based estimation techniques that rely upon a conditional independence 
assumption to produce unbiased estimates.  Unlike regression approaches, however, audit studies 
do not need to make assumptions about the form of the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables (see Yinger, 1998b).   
At the same time, audit studies have a number of disadvantages.  First, like other 
experimental methods, audit studies are often limited in their external validity.  Consequently, an 
audit study does not provide evidence on discrimination in general, but rather informs us about 
discrimination within the specific context defined by the study’s sampling frame (Yinger 1998b).  
Because of this audit studies can be limited in distinguishing the broader circumstances—in 
particular the market conditions—in which discrimination in commercial transactions might 
occur.  This is unfortunate since identifying the conditions most conducive to consumer market 
discrimination would provide valuable information to consumers about the prices and search 
costs they face and would allow enforcement of anti-discrimination measures to be more 
effectively targeted.  Moreover, audit studies are not particularly useful in situations, for 
example, in shops or restaurants, where the risk of discrimination per transaction is low 
(Siegleman, 1998) or in measuring the effects of disparate impact discrimination (as opposed to 
disparate treatment discrimination) (Yinger, 1998a;b).   
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This paper advances our understanding of consumer market discrimination by analyzing 
the relationship between the characteristics of local markets and the propensity for consumers to 
be subjected to racial and ethnic discrimination in their everyday commercial transactions.  We 
offer several innovations on the existing, mainly audit-based, studies of discrimination in the 
automobile and housing markets.  First, we take advantage of a unique survey of active-duty 
Army personnel—the Armed Forces Equal Opportunity Survey (AF-EOS)—that asks directly 
about off-base discrimination in patronizing local businesses as well as in acquiring non-
governmental housing.  This allows us to move beyond the analysis of the housing market to also 
consider discrimination in other kinds of routine commercial transactions like shopping, eating in 
restaurants, banking, etc.2  Second, a randomized variable extracted from the confidential AF-
EOS data file allows us to identify separate Army bases and hence the local communities in 
which they are located.  Consequently, we are able to analyze the extent to which consumer 
market discrimination is related to the ethnic and racial composition, economic vulnerability, 
housing market, and social context in the local community.  To our knowledge, this paper is the 
first to assess the impact of these market conditions across a range of representative communities 
on the propensity to experience discrimination in day-to-day commercial transactions generally. 
Our model fits into the class of models designed to estimate the effects of neighborhood 
characteristics on individual behavior.  The key methodological challenge in estimating such 
models is to isolate the exogenous effects of local communities (neighborhoods) from the effects 
of correlations in observed, community characteristics and unobserved, individual characteristics 
that result from individuals’ decisions about where to live and work.  We are able to avoid this 
type of selectivity bias because Army personnel are assigned to (rather than select) their 
installations.  Though the Army’s assignment procedure is not literally random in the sense that 
                                                 
2 Siegleman (1998) refers to this as discrimination in “public accommodation”. 
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soldiers are assigned to bases by a lottery, assignments are made solely on the basis of skills 
without respect to a soldier’s race or ethnicity.  In fact, the military argues that within rank and 
occupation all members are equally likely to be assigned to a particular base (Lleras-Muney, 
2005).  Though there is some scope for personnel to express a preference for duty locations as 
they advance in rank and gain military experience, it is the case that the Army’s needs remain the 
single overriding factor in the assignment of personnel to specific locations (Lyle, 2006; Lleras-
Muney, 2005).  In effect, the Army’s assignment of personnel is akin to ‘ignorable’ treatment 
assignment in the evaluation literature (Rubin 1978) allowing us to use standard regression 
techniques to generate unbiased estimates of the causal effect of local market conditions on the 
level of consumer market discrimination.   
  These innovations allow us to analyze the geographic dimension of discrimination in a 
way that adds depth to the conclusions drawn from previous studies of racial and ethnic 
discrimination in commercial transactions.  At the same time, the outcome we are investigating 
(i.e., survey-based reports of disparate impact) is different to that typically encountered in 
standard, audit studies (i.e., incidents of disparate treatment).  As Siegleman (1998) notes, one 
limitation of survey data in studying discrimination is that respondents are not always aware that 
they have been discriminated against, while they may also incorrectly attribute certain events—
instances of bad service for example—to the effects of race or ethnicity even when the behavior 
was not racially motivated.  Thus, it is not clear whether survey responses under- or over-state 
the extent of disparate treatment that individuals have faced.  Despite this, survey reports of 
discrimination are of interest for at least two reasons.3  First, enforcement of equal opportunity 
legislation typically relies upon consumer complaints to identify cases of potential 
                                                 
3 Survey data have also been used to study labor market discrimination (see for example Kuhn, 1987; Antecol and 
Kuhn, 2000).  
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discrimination.  Second, the literature suggests that individuals’ views about the amount of 
employment discrimination they face influence a range of other outcomes including job 
satisfaction and job separation (see Antecol and Cobb-Clark, 2005; Johnson and Neumark, 1997) 
and it is sensible to expect the same to be true of discrimination in the consumer market.  For 
both these reasons it is of interest to assess the factors related to individuals’ reports of consumer 
market discrimination. 
Our results indicate that, overall one in ten soldiers report that they or their families have 
experienced racial discrimination in finding non-government housing or in patronizing 
businesses in their local communities.  Discrimination is related to a community’s demographic 
profile with white and Asian soldiers feeling more unwelcome in local businesses as the local 
population becomes more heavily weighted towards other groups.  Moreover, there is evidence 
that increased economic vulnerability in the community results in more housing discrimination 
amongst minorities.  While the evidence that increased competition reduces consumer market 
discrimination is mixed, it is clear that discrimination is related to the nature of soldier’s 
interaction with the local community.   
 
2.  Consumer Market Discrimination in Military Communities  
Given our data, we will have little to say about the differences in consumer market 
discrimination in military and nonmilitary communities.  Rather our interest is in assessing 
whether the characteristics of military communities are important in explaining disparities in the 
extent to which consumers face discrimination in their daily commercial transactions.  
Consequently, it is useful to begin by briefly reviewing the history of the U.S. military’s 
interaction with the local communities surrounding its bases. 
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In 1948, President Truman issued an executive order prohibiting racial discrimination in 
the military and beginning the slow and often controversial process of desegregating the armed 
forces.  Desegregation proceeded unevenly occurring more quickly (and easily) on the base than 
off it.  Minorities who enjoyed equal access to job assignments, training opportunities, housing 
and schools on the base, were expected to abide by local racial customs—including formal or 
informal segregation—when operating in the local community nearby.  Consequently, black 
personnel were often unable to access off-base restaurants, theatres, schools and housing 
(Mershon and Schlossman, 1998).4  Military leaders were reluctant to address discrimination in 
local communities arguing that Truman’s executive order did not apply off base.   
Growing pressure from civil rights leaders and an increasing recognition of the 
detrimental effect of off-base discrimination on military readiness and troop moral prompted the 
Department of Defense to issue a directive in 1963 that: 
“Every military commander has the responsibility to oppose discriminatory 
practices affecting his men and their dependents and to foster equal 
opportunity for them, not only in areas under his immediate control, but also 
in nearby communities where they may gather in off-duty hours.” 
 
Commanding officers were also authorized to declare businesses, housing projects, and other 
establishments practicing racial discrimination to be off limits to military personnel.  This power 
was to be used only with the prior approval of the secretary of defense, however (Mershon and 
Schlossman, 1998, pg. 294).  The question of whether it was appropriate to use military authority 
to end discrimination in nearby communities was debated for years and it was not until 1967 that 
sanctions against local businesses were first authorized.  It took three more years before 
                                                 
4 The result was an odd disjuncture in on- and off-base interactions.  On the base, blacks and whites used the same 
recreational facilities, though similar establishments in local communities often continued to exclude blacks.  Taxi 
drivers permitted blacks and whites to ride together while on the base, though at the gate one group or the other was 
expected to disembark in order to take a separate cab into the local community where segregation remained the 
norm (Nichols, 1954 as cited in Mershon and Schlossman, 1998, p. 254.) 
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commanders were given the authority to—without prior approval—declare the housing 
surrounding U.S. bases off-limits if landlords practiced discrimination (Foner, 1974, pg. 220).   
Although full implementation of the military’s policies to end off-base discrimination against 
military personnel proceeded slowly, today commanding officers have broad powers to deal with 
discrimination both on and off the base (Dansby and Landis, 2001, pg 16).   
Given this history, it is perhaps not surprising that sociologists estimate that there is 
significantly less racial segregation in military communities—a fact that they attribute in part to 
the influence of military commanders on the local housing markets (Farley and Frey, 1994).  For 
example, Hershfield (1985) reports that in 1967 only 60 percent of off-base military housing was 
open to personnel of all races, but by 1968 this had increased to 90 percent.  Moreover, the move 
to equal opportunity housing was more extensive in places where military employment 
represented a higher proportion of the total workforce.   
       
3. Estimation Strategy 
We begin with a conceptual framework in which individuals’ propensity to report experiencing 
consumer market discrimination is driven both by the amount of discrimination an individual is 
subjected to within the local community as well as his or her tolerance for (or perceptions of) 
discriminatory behavior.  Thus, our model seeks to estimate the factors driving the underlying 
level of discrimination against minority consumers within the local market, while at the same 
time accounting for those characteristics that might affect an individual’s tendency to attribute 
his or her experiences to the effects of race or ethnicity.  Of course a soldier’s propensity to 
experience discrimination depends also on the nature (and frequency) of his or her contact with 
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the local community.  Army personnel who live off base and have families are likely to have 
very different interactions with their civilian neighbors than are single personnel living on base.   
We use the following reduced-form model to assess a soldier i’s propensity to experience 
racial discrimination in community j ( *ijD ): 
*
ij j ij i ijD Z Xφ β μ ε= + + +      (1) 
where and jZ ijX  (discussed below) account for those factors driving community-level 
discrimination and the individual characteristics capturing both the nature of a soldier’s 
interaction with the community and his or her perceptions of discrimination, respectively.  
Finally, unobserved, individual characteristics are given by iμ  while ijε  is a random error term.       
As discussed in Section 1, the primary methodological difficulty in estimating 
neighborhood effects models like that in equation (1) is to isolate the exogenous effects of local 
communities from the effects of unobserved individual characteristics that are correlated with 
location choice.5  Specifically, since individuals typically choose where they live, the 
characteristics of the local community ( ) will be correlated with both the observable ( ) and 
unobservable characteristics (
jZ ijX
iμ ) of individuals.  This results in an omitted variables problem 
and implies that standard regression models will produce biased estimates of the neighborhood 
effects (φ ).6   
 A variety of econometric methods including instrumental variables and fixed-effects 
estimation have been used in the literature to deal with this problem.  Some researchers have 
taken advantage of the random assignment of college roommates (Sacerdote, 2001; Foster 2004) 
or policy experiments in which randomly chosen individuals are offered an incentive to move to 
                                                 
5 Manski (1993) refers to this as “exogenous” effects. 
6 See Plotnik and Hoffman (1996), Dietz, (2002), and Haurin, et al., (2002). 
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a different neighborhood (Ludwig, et al., 2001; Katz, et al., 2001; Kling, et al., 2004).  In our 
case, we exploit the fact that Army personnel are assigned to (rather than choose) their military 
installations.  Assignments are made on the basis of an individual’s skills or training and an 
installation’s specific needs (Lyle, 2006; Lleras-Muney, 2005)—not on the basis of race or 
ethnicity.  This assignment procedure implies that any unobserved characteristics associated with 
the propensity to report discrimination will be uncorrelated with the characteristics of local 
communities.7  Consequently, we can interpret  as the causal impact of community 
characteristics on consumer market discrimination rather than an effect stemming from the 
unobserved characteristics of military personnel living in that community.   
φˆ
The propensity to experience consumer market discrimination is unobserved, so we 
create an indicator variable reflecting the presence or absence of reported discrimination.  
Specifically, 
Pr( 1) Pr( 0) ( )ij j ij ijD Z X Qφ β η γ= = + + > = Φ    (2) 
where ( , )j ijQ Z X= , ( , )γ φ β= , ij j ijη μ ε= + , andΦ  is the standard normal cumulative density 
function.  Finally, we assume that ~ (0,1)ij Nη  and that ijη  is independent of the explanatory 
variables in equation (2).   
 
4.  The Armed Forced Equal Opportunity Survey 
We use a sample of Army personnel drawn from the public-use 1996 U.S. Armed Forces Equal 
Opportunity Survey (AF-EOS).  We focus solely on Army personnel, as opposed to personnel 
                                                 
7 The Army’s personnel assignment process has also been used to assess the impact of pollution on child health 
(Lleras-Muney, 2005), the effect of parental absences on children’s educational attainment (Lyle, 2006), and the 
effect of work-related absences on divorce rates, spousal employment, and children’s disability (Angrist and 
Johnson, 2000).  For more information about military procedures regarding duty locations see 
http://usmilitary.about.com/cs/joiningup/a/recruiter10.htm. 
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from other branches of the military, as the previous literature documents that Army personnel’s 
assignments to duty location are closely linked to the needs of the Army and can be treated as 
exogenous for our purposes (see Lyle, 2006; Lleras-Muney, 2005).  The data generalize to Army 
personnel with at least six months of active-duty service who are below the rank of general.  
Minority groups were oversampled to ensure adequate numbers of minorities were available for 
analysis.  Questionnaires were mailed to sample members between September of 1996 and 
January of 1997 and the overall response rate was 52.7 percent (see Elig et al., 1997; Wheeless et 
al., 1997 for more details).8   
The AF-EOS data provide us with information on reports of consumer market 
discrimination, demographic and human capital characteristics, as well as a randomized variable 
extracted from the confidential file that allows us to identify separate Army installations.  The 
ability to identify unique Army installations is extremely important for our purposes as it allows 
us to match Army bases to their surrounding communities.   
We restrict our analysis to individuals with non-missing installation codes so as to match 
individuals to their local communities.  Moreover, we only consider installations for which we 
have a sample of at least 10 active-duty members.  Finally, we exclude Native-Americans due to 
small sample size.  These restrictions produce a final sample of 1,545 (white), 2,207 (black), 
1,887 (Hispanic), and 1,207 (Asian) Army personnel with non-missing values for the key 
variables.   
       
 
                                                 
8 A unique feature of the AF-EOS data is that it contains basic demographic information for both respondents and 
non-respondents.  Using this data, we find that while Hispanics and Asians were disproportionately likely to respond 
to the survey, blacks are under-represented among respondents.  These differences—while significant—are 
generally minor suggesting that the characteristics of the two groups are much the same.  
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4.1 The Extent of Consumer Market Discrimination Across Communities 
Army personnel captured in the AF-EOS were asked whether – due to race or ethnicity – they or 
a member of their family had in the previous 12 months:  1) been discriminated against for non-
government housing; or 2) been made to feel unwelcome by a local business.  We begin by using 
these data to create a single indicator variable for overall consumer market discrimination which 
equals one when either of the above is reported (and race/ethnicity was a factor) and zero 
otherwise.  We create indicator variables for the individual components analogously.  Means and 
standard deviations for our aggregate measure and its components are presented in Table 1. 
Overall, one in ten soldiers report that they or their families have experienced racial or 
ethnic discrimination in their day-to-day commercial transactions off the base.  Not surprisingly, 
experiences of discrimination vary substantially across racial groups, with blacks being 
approximately four times as likely as whites to report consumer market discrimination.  
Individuals of all races are much more likely to report being made to feel unwelcome when 
patronizing local businesses than to report discrimination in finding housing.  Almost one in four 
blacks, and approximately one in ten Asians and Hispanics reported experiencing this type of 
discrimination in the previous twelve months.  The low incidence of housing discrimination is 
perhaps not surprising given the unique history of desegregation in military communities. 
A histogram of the incidence of consumer market discrimination across local 
communities (see Figure 1) illustrates that there is a great deal of geographic variation in the 
extent to which Army personnel report experiencing discrimination in their day-to-day 
commercial transactions.  In particular, the incidence of consumer market discrimination varies 
from 0 to 50.9 percent.  Moreover, this variation is largely unexplained by differences in the 
characteristics of those Army personnel serving in different communities.  We examined this by 
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conducting a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the disparity in the discrimination rates 
of the 15 percent of installations with the highest level of discrimination on the one hand and the 
15 percent of installations with the lowest level of discrimination on the other.  Our results reveal 
that less than 5.0 percent of the gap in the incidence of discriminatory encounters can be 
explained by differences in the characteristics of soldiers.  The vast majority of the gap stems 
from differences across communities in the propensity for personnel with similar characteristics 
to report experiencing consumer market discrimination.   
We also investigated the relationship between individual and community characteristics 
by regressing soldiers’ race, education, rank, and years of service on a series of community 
characteristics.  The race dummies are generally not significant at the five percent level 
suggesting that—controlling for rank and skills—personnel of different races are equally likely 
to be assigned to communities with different characteristics (see Appendix Table 1).   
        
4.2  Characterizing Local Consumer Market Discrimination  
Our conceptual framework suggests that soldiers’ reports of racial and ethnic discrimination 
depend in part on the overall level of consumer market discrimination in the local communities 
surrounding Army bases.  We operationalize this idea by defining the ‘local community’ 
surrounding each of the 67 bases identified in our estimation sample to be the set of individual 
towns, cities, or localities situated within a 10-mile radius of the specific base.  Community-level 
characteristics (drawn from Census data) are matched to each individual city, town or locality 
within this 10-mile radius and then aggregated up to the ‘local community’ level weighting by 
population size.9  Finally, local community-level characteristics are then assigned to each 
                                                 
9 See the appendix for more details. 
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individual based on his or her installation.  This process links soldiers to those dimensions of 
their communities that may drive the extent to which local businesses discriminate.   
What drives the underlying level of consumer market discrimination within 
communities?  Previous researchers have drawn on models commonly used to understand 
discrimination in employment relationships to shed light on discrimination in commercial 
relationships (see for example, Yinger, 1998a; Ondrich, et al., 1999; Choi, et al., 2005).  
Specifically, Becker’s (1971) notion of prejudice-based discrimination suggests that differential 
treatment arises because certain groups—in this case merchants, their agents, or even potential 
customers—find it more costly (or less productive) to trade across racial and ethnic lines.  
Landlords may discriminate, for example, because they simply dislike renting to individuals of a 
different race, while restaurant owners might find that their employees demand a higher wage for 
serving minorities.  Any inter-racial animosity on the part of existing or future customers would 
further strengthen the returns to trading only within racial groups particularly when the specific 
commercial transaction is public (e.g., housing or restaurants) rather than private (e.g., banking 
or medical care).  Prejudice-based models imply that consumer market discrimination will 
depend on the racial composition of the local community; not only because this will be 
correlated with the race of business owners themselves, but also because the community’s 
demographic profile will determine the racial composition of employees and potential customers.  
Moreover, customer prejudice leads us to expect more discrimination everything else equal in 
those commercial transactions that can be observed by others than in those that cannot.  Finally, 
as usual we would expect consumer market discrimination to be less prevalent in more 
competitive markets. 
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Statistical discrimination, on the other hand, is born out of information asymmetries (see 
Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972).  Statistical discrimination can also lead to disparities in commercial 
transactions if, for example, landlords or other business owners believe that future payment 
streams—conditional on observable characteristics like employment status or income—differ 
between groups.  This type of information asymmetry is almost certain to be more important in 
on-going commercial relationships than in sporadic transactions.  Finally, some researchers 
argue that competition over scarce resources can also lead to disparities in aggregate outcomes 
(see Frijters, 1998; Mason, 1995), raising the possibility that consumer market discrimination 
might stem from economic vulnerability more generally.10
In what follow, racial and ethnic diversity is captured by the share of the local population 
in various race groups (i.e., white, black, Asian, and other) in community j.11  We begin by 
aggregating these proportions to calculate the proportion of the total population that is in a racial 
or ethnic group different to ones own.12  We then disaggregate this effect by controlling for the 
population share of each racial group (other than the respondent’s) separately.  These measures 
allow us to assess whether consumer market discrimination is related to a community’s racial 
and ethnic profile.13   
In addition, dimensions of the local housing market (i.e., home ownership rates and 
median mortgage values) are included in the model of housing discrimination to specifically 
account for the degree of competition in that market.  High home ownership rates are also 
                                                 
10 Yinger (1998a) reviews the empirical audit-based evidence on the source of consumer market discrimination.  He 
concludes that the available evidence—primarily from the automobile and housing markets—indicates that 
consumer market discrimination has a variety of multifaceted causes that can differ across behaviors and groups.  
See also Ondrich, et al., 1999 and Choi, et al., 2005. 
11 While Census data do separately identify Hispanics, they are not a mutually exclusive racial group.  Alesina, et 
al., (1999) argue, however, that ‘other’ is a good measure of the Hispanic population.  Native Americans are 
included in the ‘white’ category.  
12 For Hispanics this equals one minus the Census measure of the Hispanic share of the local population. 
13 Summary statistics for community- and individual-level variables are given in Appendix Tables 2 and 3. 
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associated with enhanced social networks (Haurin, et al., 2002) and less crime (Glaeser and 
Sacerdote, 1999) which may affect consumer market discrimination.  We are unable to control 
directly for competition in other consumer markets.  However, we do control for the number of 
individual cities, towns or localities that make up each local community in order to account for 
the amount of choice that Army personnel have about where they live and shop.  
We also control for four measures of economic vulnerability: the unemployment rate, the 
poverty rate, income inequality, and the crime rate.14  These variables allow us to assess the role 
that competition over scarce resources might play in furthering our understanding of the 
commercial transactions between racial groups.  It also seems likely that consumer market 
discrimination depends on the general social context.  Given this, we also include controls for 
community size15 and whether the community is located in a southern or Pacific state.   
  Finally, Army personnel differ in the nature of their interaction with local communities as 
well as in their tendency to attribute their experiences to the effects of race.  Consequently, our 
estimation model also includes an extensive list of individual-level characteristics that previous 
research would suggest are likely to be related to the propensity to report consumer market 
discrimination.  Specifically, we include demographic characteristics (indicator variables for 
female, currently married, interracial marriage, and the presence of children), education levels 
(indicator variable for a college degree), and job characteristics (indicator variables for years of 
service, officer status, and living off base).   
 
                                                 
14 Income inequality is measured as the log of the ratio of per capita income for the racial group with the highest 
income and the income of the racial group with the lowest income in a local community.  In this case, we separately 
identify the ‘white’ category from the ‘Native American’ category.  We also consider the level of violent crime 
which is calculated as (the number of violent crimes/the fbi population)*100,000.  Therefore, it measures – at the 
county level – crimes per 100,000 of the population. 
15 This is measured as the natural log of the total population/1000. 
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5. Consumer Market Discrimination in Local Communities  
We begin by estimating reduced-form, probit models of business and housing discrimination as 
specified in equation (2).16  Although the effects of both individual and community-level 
characteristics are estimated together, for convenience we present and discuss each separately.  
We report marginal effects (evaluated at means) and standard errors (calculated using the delta 
method).17   
 
5.1 The Effect of Community Characteristics on Community-Level Discrimination  
5.1.1 Demographic Profiles: 
White and Asian personnel’s chances of experiencing race discrimination in patronizing local 
businesses increase as the demographic composition of the local community becomes more 
heavily weighted towards other racial and ethnic groups (see Table 2).  For whites and Asians 
these demographic effects are quite large.  A one percent increase in the non-white population 
results in a 0.98 percent increase in the likelihood that a white soldier reports experiencing 
discrimination when patronizing local businesses off the base.  A similar increase in the non-
Asian population leads to a 2.5 percent increase in the propensity of Asian soldiers to feel 
unwelcome in local businesses.18  Asian personnel also report significantly more housing 
discrimination in communities in which the non-Asian population is larger and this effect quite 
large in magnitude.  A one percent increase in the non-Asian population implies a 3.6% increase 
in the propensity for Asians to report housing discrimination.  Interestingly, a one percent 
                                                 
16 Estimation is conducted separately by race.  Given the very small number of white personnel who report housing 
discrimination, we estimate the housing model only for minorities. 
17 In all models, we have accounted for clustering on communities when calculating standard errors. 
18 These are elasticities based on the marginal effects presented in Table 2, mean discrimination (see Table 1), and 
mean community-level characteristics (see Appendix Table 2).  
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increase in the non-black population results in a 1.2 percent decrease in the proportion of black 
soldiers reporting racial discrimination for non-government housing.  
Disaggregating the overall effect of being different by race and ethnicity highlights the 
differences in the relationships between specific racial groups (see Table 3).  In particular, whites 
are more likely to face discrimination from local businesses in communities with higher numbers 
of Asian and Pacific Islanders, while Asians are more likely to feel unwelcome at local 
businesses as the relative size of the white and black population grows.  Blacks, on the other 
hand, experience less housing discrimination in markets where the proportion of others (who are 
predominately Hispanics) is larger.   
Consistent with previous research in the housing market (see for example Yinger 1986; 
Page 1995), our results also confirm the importance of a community’s demographic profile in 
understanding consumer market discrimination.19  At the same time, it is also clear that inter-
group interactions are quite complex and that it is important to consider relationships between 
specific groups in detail.  Audit studies, in contrast, often characterize neighborhoods solely 
along black-white lines only occasionally taking Hispanics into account and failing completely to 
consider the experiences of Asian consumers.  This is likely to be particularly problematic in 
housing markets as a lack of variation in the racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods 
limits the ability of audit studies to uncover racial and ethnic steering (Yinger, 1998b).   
5.1.2 Economic Vulnerability, Housing Markets, and the Social Context: 
Interestingly, the propensity for white soldiers to report consumer market discrimination appears 
to be driven solely by the demographic composition—specifically the proportion of Asians and 
Pacific Islanders—of the local community.  We can find no evidence that economic 
                                                 
19 In contrast, audit studies of the market for cars find that neighborhood effects have virtually no effect in 
explaining discrimination (Ayres, 1991; 1995; Ayers and Siegleman, 1995). 
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vulnerability, high crime, poor housing market in the local community are related to the extent to 
which whites are discriminated against when patronizing local businesses.   
There is evidence, however, that increased economic vulnerability results in more 
housing discrimination amongst minorities.  Black soldiers, for example, find it more difficult to 
obtain non-government housing in poorer communities, while higher crime rates are associated 
with more housing discrimination amongst Hispanics.  Thus, housing market discrimination—
like labor market discrimination—may result in part from competition between racial and ethnic 
groups for access to scarce resources (see Frijters, 1998; Mason, 1995).  At the same time, 
Hispanics report less housing discrimination as the poverty rate increases, while discrimination 
by local businesses seems generally unrelated to a community’s economic vulnerability.  
Economic vulnerability seems to be more important in understanding discrimination for some 
groups than others as well as in understanding housing transactions which (unlike many other 
commercial transactions) are by and large both ongoing and public.  
Interestingly, home ownership rates and average house values are generally unrelated to 
incidents of housing discrimination amongst minority personnel though Asians appear to be an 
exception.  Moreover, Army personnel do not report significantly more housing discrimination 
where the number of individual cities, towns or localities making up their local area is smaller.  
Thus, incidents of housing discrimination do not appear to be tied to the extent of competition in 
the local housing market.  This is consistent with the view that military policy may have been 
effective in minimizing widespread, systematic housing discrimination in military communities 
(see Farley and Frey, 1994a).  At the same time, Choi, et al., (2005) also find that 
homeownership rates and median house values are unrelated to housing discrimination in audits 
using black-white testers suggesting that this relationship may hold more widely.  Still, black 
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soldiers are less likely to report being unwelcome in local businesses when they have more 
choice about the local cities, towns, and localities that they can patronize, though Hispanic 
personnel are more likely to report this type of discrimination when they have more choice.  
Thus, the evidence for increased competition reducing consumer market discrimination is mixed.  
On the one hand, this may imply that commercial relationships—unlike employment 
relationships—are not sensitive to the overall level of competition in the market.  More likely, 
these results indicate that our measures may not adequately capture market competition. 
There are regional differences in levels of consumer market discrimination, though not 
surprisingly these effects differ across racial and ethnic groups.  While black soldiers are less 
likely to feel unwelcome in local businesses in the South, Hispanics report less business 
discrimination in the Pacific region of the United States.  Blacks also report less discrimination 
in acquiring non-government housing in Southern or Pacific communities.  Finally, community 
size is positively related to housing discrimination for Hispanics and Asians, but is negatively 
related to housing discrimination for blacks.   
 
5.2 The Effect of Individuals’ Characteristics on Community-Level Discrimination 
Our conceptual framework suggests that consumer market discrimination depends not only on 
the characteristics of the local community itself, but also on the way in which individuals interact 
with the local community and the extent to which they are inclined to attribute any unpleasant 
interactions to the effects of race or ethnicity.  Thus, it is not surprising that ones family situation 
and living arrangements are also related to the experiences of discriminatory treatment when 
patronizing local businesses.  Married personnel are between 20.6 (blacks) and 92.1 percent 
(Hispanics) more likely than single personnel to report feeling unwelcome in local businesses 
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because of their race.  This is perhaps not surprising given that personnel are reporting incidents 
that either they or their families have experienced.  At the same time, Hispanics who are married 
to non-Hispanics report only somewhat more discrimination in their daily commercial 
transactions than Hispanics who are not married, while the presence of children actually reduces 
the incidence of business discrimination for black and Hispanic soldiers.  Similarly, white 
soldiers living off the base feel relatively more comfortable in patronizing local businesses than 
their counterparts living on the base.  Clearly, many incidents of consumer market discrimination 
may be related to the nature of soldiers’ interaction with the local community.  Having children 
or living in the local community seems to lead soldiers and their families to feel more 
comfortable in patronizing local businesses.  Still, problems in acquiring non-government 
housing are not in general greater for personnel who are married or have children.20  This is 
surprising given that the type of housing that one desires is likely to depend on family structure.   
Individuals’ human capital and job characteristics are also related to the propensity to 
report experiencing consumer market discrimination.  Hispanic and Asian officers face less 
housing discrimination and are less likely to feel unwelcome in local businesses than their 
enlisted counterparts, while blacks living off the base report more housing discrimination.  
Finally, business discrimination is occasionally related to individuals’ education level and Army 
tenure, though again the effects are not generally consistent across racial and ethnic groups. 
 
6.  Alternative Notions of Local Communities 
Our preferred notion of a ‘local community’ is the set of individual towns, cities, or localities 
situated within a 10-mile radius of the specific installation.  This definition of a local 
                                                 
20 The exception is that married, black soldiers report significantly more housing discrimination than their single 
black counterparts. 
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community—while sensible—is also ad hoc, and it is important to test the sensitivity of our 
results to alternative definitions of what constitutes the local community surrounding a military 
base.  We do this first by considering two alternative notions of local community; one that is 
narrower (towns, cities, localities within a 5-mile radius of the base) and one that is wider (the 
county in which the military base is located) than our current definition.  Finally, we also 
consider the extent to which the ‘local community’ might be the military installation itself. 
To identify the places situated within 5 miles of our Army installations we followed a 
similar procedure to that outlined in Section 4.2 and in the data appendix.  Depending on the 
location of the installation, this technique led to many fewer cities, towns, and localities being 
identified as constituting the local community of the military base. The characteristics of each 
individual place were then aggregated up using a weighted average by population size to the 
local community level for each of the 65 installations included in our analysis.21   
We also identified the county in which each of our 67 military installations is located 
using the procedure described in the data appendix.  We then used Census information at the 
county-level to characterize the local communities surrounding military installations. 
Using these two alternative definitions of local communities, we re-estimated equation 
(2).22  Most of our substantive conclusions remain unchanged.  Experiences of consumer market 
discrimination are related to the nature of an individual’s interaction with the local community 
no matter which definition of the local community we consider. The relationship between 
economic vulnerability and housing becomes even stronger when we use either the five-mile or 
county-level definition of community, while the effects of the demographic composition of the 
population on both types of discrimination also become stronger when we consider communities 
                                                 
21 The 5-mile definition has two fewer installations relative to the 10-mile and county definitions, as two 
installations have no towns within a 5-mile radius. 
22 These results are not presented here, but are available upon request. 
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within five miles of the installation.  There is, however, less evidence that competition (as 
measured in the number of different localities within a community) affects consumer market 
discrimination when we use our five-mile definition of communities.  
  Finally, our previous research indicates that measures of an installation’s equal 
opportunity climate, demographic composition, and social prescriptions regarding inter-racial 
relations explain between 35 and 40 percent of the installation-specific variation in the on-base 
harassment of military personnel (Antecol and Cobb-Clark, 2005).  As there is a one-to-one 
match between installations and local communities, it seems reasonable to assess whether or not 
we are estimating the effects of the local communities per se or whether it is the case that 
community-level factors are simply reflecting the nature of the installations themselves.   
We test this proposition by using a linear probability model to re-estimate equation (2) 
dropping our community-level variables and instead including a number of controls for 
installation-specific characteristics.  Specifically, we estimate the effect of the installation’s 
equal opportunity climate, social prescriptions, and demographic characteristics on reported 
incidents of community-level harassment.  These installation-specific characteristics are 
described more fully in the data appendix and in Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2004; 2005).   
Moreover, we re-estimated an unrestricted version of equation (2) including only our individual 
characteristics and a full set of indicator variables for specific local communities.  Given the one-
to-one match between communities and bases this set of indicator variables also completely 
accounts for bases.     
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 5.  We find that while installation 
characteristics explain at most 9.4 percent of the variation in consumer market discrimination, 
the characteristics of local communities between 17.7 and 55.6 percent of the variation in 
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consumer market discrimination across communities.23  In every case, community characteristics 
are substantially more important than installation characteristics in explaining reported 
discrimination in patronizing local businesses.  In particular, community characteristics explain 
52.8 percent of the variation in the consumer market discrimination reported by whites and 17.9 
percent of the discrimination reported by blacks.  In contrast, installation characteristics only 
explain 4.2 and 2.2 percent, respectively.  Thus, it appears to be the case that while on-base 
harassment is best explained by the nature of race relations on the military base, off-base 
discrimination depends on the characteristics of the surrounding communities themselves.  
Furthermore, Breusch-Pagan (1980) tests indicate that any remaining (unobserved) heterogeneity 
in local communities themselves is unimportant in understanding discrimination levels once the 
characteristics of those communities are controlled.24   
       
7. Conclusions  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many consumers routinely experience discrimination in their 
day-to-day commercial transactions.  Consumer market discrimination is problematic because it 
                                                 
23 To gauge the predictive power of our community- and installation-specific controls, we used a linear probability 
model to estimate a base model that included individual characteristics only.  (This is specification one in Table 5.)  
We then estimated an unrestricted model in which a complete set of indicator variables for communities/installations 
were added to the base model to control for fixed effects associated with installations and the surrounding 
communities. (This is specification two.) We then estimate two alternative restricted models, specifications three 
and four, in which we replace the complete set of indicator variables for communities/installations with installation-
specific controls and community-specific controls, respectively. We compared the R-squared from this unrestricted 
model to both the base and two alternative restricted models  as follows: 
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We used a linear probability model as opposed to a probit model due to the unstable nature of probit models when 
fixed effects are included. 
24 We investigated this issue by using an unweighted, linear probability model including an unobserved, community-
specific effect in equation (2).  We fail to reject the hypothesis that the variance of the community-specific effects is 
equal to 0. 
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limits access to fundamental goods and services, leads to wealth inequalities, and reduces 
consumers’ wellbeing more generally. 
This paper advances our understanding of consumer market discrimination by analyzing 
the relationship between the ethnic and racial composition, economic vulnerability, housing 
market, and social context of the local community, on the one hand, and the propensity for 
consumers to be subjected to racial and ethnic discrimination in their everyday commercial 
transactions on the other.  A unique survey of active-duty Army personnel allows us to move 
beyond the analysis of the housing market to also consider discrimination in other kinds of 
routine commercial transactions like shopping, eating in restaurants, banking, etc.  As Army 
personnel are assigned to (rather than select) their installations, we are able to avoid the 
selectivity bias normally encountered when studying the effects of neighborhood characteristics 
on individual behavior.  Consequently, we are able to study the causal effect of local market 
conditions on consumer market discrimination.   
Our results indicate that, consumer market discrimination is quite widespread with one in 
ten soldiers indicating that they (or their families) experienced racial or ethnic discrimination in 
finding non-government housing or in patronizing local businesses in the previous twelve 
months.  Consumer market discrimination is related to a community’s demographic profile 
though the relationship is complex and depends on inter-racial interactions between specific 
groups.  Increased economic vulnerability in the community appears to result in more housing 
discrimination amongst minorities.  Finally, the evidence that increased competition reduces 
consumer market discrimination is mixed, however, discrimination is clearly related to the nature 
of soldier’s interaction with the local community.   
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Our focus on the geographic dimension of consumer market discrimination adds depth to 
the conclusions drawn from previous audit-based studies of racial and ethnic discrimination in 
the housing and automobile market.  While audits are extremely useful in understanding the 
extent of disparate treatment in commercial transactions, it is also important to understand the 
process that leads consumers to feel that they have been discriminated against (i.e., disparate 
impact).  After all, enforcement of equal opportunity legislation is reliant upon consumer 
complaints to identify cases of potential discrimination and it is sensible to expect perceptions of 
consumer market discrimination to influence a range of other outcomes of interest including, 
search behavior, location choice, etc.  
  At the same time, we are limited in our understanding of several important aspects of the 
discrimination that individuals face in the consumer market.  Specifically, we know nothing 
about the specific incidents that individuals have in mind when they report that their race or 
ethnicity limited their ability to acquire non-government housing or freely patronize local 
businesses.  Knowing the race of the perpetrator would allow us to make more headway in 
sorting out the source consumer market discrimination, for example (see Yinger, 1998a).  
Similarly, knowing more about the nature of the businesses that consumers are patronizing 
would allow us to investigate how discrimination might vary across different types of 
commercial transactions.  Finally, a better understanding of those transactions in which 
discrimination is relatively common would allow us to directly assess the power of increased 
competition to reduce consumer market discrimination. 
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Data Appendix:  Definitions of Local Communities  
A.1  Measured within 10-miles of Installation 
Our preferred definition of ‘local community’ includes all those towns, cities, and localities 
within a 10-mile radius of each installation.  We determined if a community is within 10 miles of 
an installation using “ePodunk”, which is a search engine that allows one to map the distance 
between locations.25  In particular, ePodunk lists military installations by state and provides links 
to information about the base including the names of local communities near the installation.26  
Most importantly for our purposes, users can specify within how many miles of the installation 
the local community must be.27  Depending on the location of the installation, this technique 
could lead to as few as one community within the 10-mile radius or to over 80 communities 
within 10 miles of the base.   
We then matched the list of communities drawn from ePodunk to their community-level 
characteristics (discussed in the text) using Geolytics CensusCD and Maps 1990, henceforth 
referred to as CensusCD.28  Specifically, we manually assigned each community in ePodunk the 
“areakey” from CensusCD and the “baseid” from the AF-EOS.  Next, we merged the ePodunk 
data with CensusCD data by areakey.  This resulted in a data set that included community-level 
characteristics for all communities located within 10 miles of the Army installations in the AF-
                                                 
25 ePodunk collects its information on communities from the 2000 U.S. census.  For more information go to: 
http://www.epodunk.com/. 
26 ePodunk also provides information on, the branch of service, the installation website (if available), 4-year colleges 
in the area, school districts on or near the installation, and nearby recreational activities. 
27 Unfortunately, some of our military installations were not listed in ePodunk.  For these installations we used 
zipcode as our starting point in ePodunk, and then selected communities within 10 miles of that zipcode. 
28 Some communities identified by ePodunk were not included in CensusCD.  This was not extremely problematic 
in most cases because many of these communities were in fact already counted within other communities identified 
to be part of the same local community surrounding a given installation that were included in CensusCD.  For 
example, ePodunk listed La Jolla as a community near one of our installations.  While La Jolla is not included in 
CensusCD, San Diego is and La Jolla is represented in the San Diego counts. 
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EOS.29  We then collapsed the community-level characteristics using population weights by 
baseid.  This ensured that each installation is assigned the population weighted average 
characteristics of the communities that are within 10 miles of it, so if there is only one 
community within 10 miles of an installation than that installation is assigned the characteristics 
for that community only but if there is more than one community within 10 miles than the 
installation is assigned the population weighted average characteristics of those communities.  
Finally, we merged this data into the AF-EOS by baseid such that the local community-level 
characteristics were assigned to each active-duty member based on his or her installation. 
  All community-level characteristics are measured using the procedure described above 
with the exception of our crime measure.  This characteristic is aggregated to the county level as 
the underlying data are not available at more disaggregated levels (see below for a more detailed 
discussion of our county level definition of local community). 
 
A.2  Measured within 5-miles of Installation 
To determine if a community was within 5 miles of a military installation we followed a 
similar procedure to that outlined for the 10-mile definition.  Specifically, we used ePodunk to 
determine the communities that were within 5 miles of an installation and matched those 
communities to the community-level characteristics in CensusCD.  Depending on the location of 
the installation, this technique could lead to as few as 1 community within 5 miles to 16 
communities within 5 miles.30  This is in sharp contrast to the 10-mile definition where some 
bases had more than 80 communities within 10 miles.  The characteristics by community were 
then aggregated up to the local community level using population weights for each of the 65 
                                                 
29 This process drops all other communities in the CensusCD that are not included in the AF-EOS data.   
30 Two bases did not have any communities within a 5-mile radius and were dropped from this part of the analysis.  
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Army installations included in our analysis.  These local community level characteristics were 
then assigned to each active-duty member based on his or her installation. 
 
A.3  Measured at the County Level 
  The county where the military installation is located is based on information from 
“ZIPCodeWorld”, which is a search engine that allows one to input a zipcode and then gives the 
user detailed information about that zipcode, including, but not limited to, the name of the city, 
the name of the state, the name of the county, and the county fipscode attached to that 
zipcode.31,32  To ensure accuracy we also went to each military installation’s homepage (if 
available) to verify the county in which they state their installation is located.  We did this for 
each of our 67 Army installations and then matched the county to the community-level 
characteristics in CensusCD by countyfips codes.  Finally, these local community level 
characteristics were then assigned to each active-duty member based on his or her installation. 
 
A.4 Installation-Specific Measures 
We control for equal opportunity climate through the following aggregate measures: 1) the 
overall quality of race relations; and 2) the proportion of installation personnel who are white.   
These aggregate variables are calculated by assigning each individual the weighted average rate 
of the variable of interest of his or her installation.33  
                                                 
31 For more information go to: http://www.zipcodesdatabase.com. 
32 ZIP Code information is derived from the United States Postal Service (USPS) ZIP Code Lookup tool 
(http://zip4.usps.com/zip4/welcome.jsp).  Specifically, we used the Lookup a ZIP Code by City tool to find the ZIP 
Code of each military installation.  
33 In calculating these measures we first created two indicator variables as follows: 1) positive race relations—
equaling one if the respondent to a (very) large extent believes race relations are good on their installation/ship; and 
2) white—equaling one if the respondent is white.  In all other cases—including item non-response—these two 
indicator variables are coded as zero. Weighted, installation-specific averages are then calculated and assigned to 
each individual. 
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  Moreover, we control for social prescriptions governing how different racial groups 
should interact with each other by creating an installation-level index based on information in the 
AF-EOS data.  In particular, respondents reported the extent to which: 1) they felt pressure from 
service members belonging to their own racial group not to socialize with members of other 
racial groups; (2) people feel free to sit wherever they choose in the dining halls regardless of 
race; (3) people feel free to use any recreation facilities regardless of race; (4) members of a 
racial group are treated as if they are “trouble” when they get together; and (5) personnel prefer 
to socialize with members of their own racial group when they are off duty.  Higher values of the 
index indicate fewer constraints on inter-racial interactions.  The installation level index is then 
calculated by assigning to each individual the weighted average of the aggregate social 
prescriptions index of his or her installation.34  Descriptive statistics for these measures are 
presented in Appendix Table 2. 
 
                                                 
34 Specifically, each question was answered on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very large extent) scale.  We rescaled (1), (4) 
and (5) in the opposite direction so that higher values reflect fewer constraints on inter-racial interactions.  We then 
create an aggregate index ranging from 5 to 25 for each respondent by adding up the individual’s responses to each 
of the five questions.  If the respondent did not answer all 5 questions, then for the question(s) they missed they were 
given their mean response from the question(s) they did answer. 
 33
Figure 1. Histogram of Consumer Market Discrimination 
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Table 1. Consumer Market Discrimination and its Components  by Race
Overall White Black Hispanic Asian
Consumer Market Discrimination 0.118 0.059 0.239 0.165 0.113
(0.323) (0.236) (0.427) (0.372) (0.317)
[6846] [1545] [2207] [1887] [1207]
    Unwelcomed by Local Business 0.112 0.059 0.221 0.157 0.105
    Due to Your Race/ Ethnicity (0.315) (0.235) (0.415) (0.364) (0.307)
[6838] [1545] [2201] [1886] [1206]
    Discriminated Against for Non-Government Housing 0.022 0.004 0.061 0.029 0.020
    Due to Your Race/ Ethnicity (0.146) (0.063) (0.240) (0.167) (0.140)
[6841] [1544] [2205] [1886] [1206]
Notes: Sampling weights used.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  Sample size in brackets.  Consumer market 
discrimination coded as 1 if respondent reported experiencing at least one of the respective behaviors and said his/her
race was a factor, and 0 otherwise.  Individual components of consumer market discrimination coded analogously.
Table 2. Determinants of Consumer Market Discrimination: Community-Level Characteristics
(Probit Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
Local Business Market Discrimination Housing Market Discrimination
White Black Hispanic Asian White Black Hispanic Asian
Racial/Ethnic Diversity
    % Not Your Race/Ethnicity 0.165 -0.059 0.067 0.286 -0.095 -0.005 0.078
(0.033) (0.113) (0.099) (0.095) (0.054) (0.028) (0.022)
Economic Vulnerability
    Income Inequality -0.005 -0.044 -0.175 0.012 -0.036 0.002 -0.014
(0.032) (0.077) (0.080) (0.098) (0.040) (0.030) (0.017)
    Poverty Rate -0.099 0.021 -0.085 -0.275 0.315 -0.367 0.024
(0.177) (0.346) (0.335) (0.402) (0.153) (0.117) (0.075)
    Civilian Unemployment Rate 0.026 0.218 0.139 0.359 -0.483 0.262 0.159
(0.243) (0.452) (0.439) (0.606) (0.327) (0.288) (0.110)
    Violent Crimes^,^^ -0.006 0.012 -0.026 -0.021 -0.010 0.030 -0.006
      per 100,000 Population (0.014) (0.026) (0.032) (0.037) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007)
    P-Value of Joint Test 0.887 0.935 0.065 0.765 0.281 0.016 0.220
Housing Market
    Home Ownership Rate 0.109 0.086 0.067
(0.111) (0.108) (0.045)
    Ln(Median Mortgage) -0.009 -0.010 0.037
(0.013) (0.007) (0.017)
    P-Value of Joint Test 0.553 0.230 0.099
Social Context
    South 0.021 -0.073 -0.005 -0.029 -0.068 -0.009 0.004
(0.014) (0.044) (0.037) (0.052) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005)
    Pacific 0.026 -0.075 -0.070 0.031 -0.023 -0.013 0.037
(0.029) (0.046) (0.037) (0.060) (0.013) (0.008) (0.024)
    Ln(Total Population/1000) -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 0.010 -0.009 0.008 0.003
(0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
    Number of Communities 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1545 2201 1886 1206 2205 1886 1206
Notes: All specifications also includes controls for individual characteristics (see Table 4). ^ Measured at the county level.  ^^All crime 
variables are included in the probit as crime/1000. Sampling weights used.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by installation. 
Bold (shaded) indicate significant at the 5 (10) percent level.
Table 3. Consumer Market Discrimination: Alternative Measure of Racial/Ethnic Diversity
(Probit Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
Local Business Market Discrimination Housing Market Discrimination
White Black Hispanic Asian White Black Hispanic Asian
    Percent White 0.034 0.027 0.284 -0.044 0.100 0.035
(0.152) (0.336) (0.095) (0.073) (0.119) (0.014)
    Percent Black 0.072 0.228 0.173 0.064 0.065
(0.075) (0.279) (0.175) (0.097) (0.027)
    Percent Asian/ 0.180 -0.153 0.103 -0.068 0.155
      Pacific Islander (0.037) (0.162) (0.334) (0.091) (0.130)
    Percent Other -0.212 -0.420 0.337 -0.334 -0.009
(0.188) (0.368) (0.417) (0.177) (0.038)
    P-Value of Joint Test 0.000 0.399 0.235 0.009 0.038 0.274 0.000
Observations 1545 2201 1886 1206 2205 1886 1206
Notes: Sampling weights used.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by installation.  Bold (shaded) indicate 
significant at the 5 (10) percent level.  See Tables 2 and 4 for additional control variables 
Table 4. Determinants of Consumer Market Discrimination: Individual Level Characteristics
(Probit Marginal Effects and Standard Errors)
Local Business Market Discrimination Housing Market Discrimination
White Black Hispanic Asian White Black Hispanic Asian
Family Situation
    Married 0.055 0.046 0.145 0.019 0.033 0.014 -0.019
(0.015) (0.026) (0.039) (0.031) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
    Mixed Marriage 0.013 -0.025 -0.087 0.002 0.020 -0.013 0.018
(0.018) (0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.019) (0.008) (0.012)
    Presence of Kids 0.006 -0.052 -0.110 0.016 -0.017 -0.005 0.011
(0.013) (0.030) (0.048) (0.020) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006)
Education
    College -0.037 0.005 0.096 0.002 0.000 0.016 0.006
(0.013) (0.047) (0.044) (0.031) (0.028) (0.025) (0.009)
Female 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.011 0.001 0.006 -0.005
(0.016) (0.030) (0.037) (0.035) (0.016) (0.014) (0.004)
Years of Active Service
    6 or less 0.026 -0.046 0.011 -0.003 -0.007 -0.009 0.001
(0.011) (0.020) (0.036) (0.028) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006)
Officer 0.013 -0.019 -0.115 -0.042 -0.009 -0.018 -0.010
(0.019) (0.039) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.009) (0.004)
Lives Off-Base -0.021 0.014 0.010 -0.034 0.041 -0.010 0.002
(0.010) (0.027) (0.030) (0.023) (0.016) (0.013) (0.006)
Observations 1545 2201 1886 1206 2205 1886 1206
Notes: Based on the results presented in Table 2. Sampling weights used.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
by installation. Bold (shaded) indicate significant at the 5 (10) percent level.
Table 5. Determinants of Consumer Market Discrimination:  Installation-Level Characteristics vs. Community-Level Characteristics 
(Linear Probability Models)
Local Business Market Discrimination Housing Market Discrimination
White Black Hispanic Asian White Black Hispanic Asian
Specification One
R-Squared 0.024 0.006 0.050 0.013 0.018 0.005 0.010
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community-Level Characteristics No No No No No No No
Installation-Level Characteristics No No No No No No No
Community Fixed Effects No No No No No No No
Specification Two
R-Squared 0.137 0.061 0.103 0.115 0.074 0.042 0.056
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community-Level Characteristics No No No No No No No
Installation-Level Characteristics No No No No No No No
Community Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Specification Three
R-Squared 0.028 0.008 0.054 0.019 0.019 0.007 0.014
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community-Level Characteristics No No No No No No No
Installation-Level Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Fixed Effects No No No No No No No
Specification Four
R-Squared 0.083 0.016 0.064 0.031 0.032 0.014 0.036
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community-Level Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Installation-Level Characteristics No No No No No No No
Community Fixed Effects No No No No No No No
Observations
See Tables 2 and 4 for a complete list of individual characteristics and community-level characteristics, respectively.  Installation-level characteristics
include percent white, race relations good, and social presciptions.  Racial/ethnic diversity is based on the alternative measure presented in Table 3.
Appendix Table 1. Test for Random Assignment 
(P-Values from Joint Test on Race) 
Full Sample Estimation Sample
of Respondents of Respondents
Dependent Variable
Percent White 0.156 0.472
Percent Black 0.001 0.001
Percent Hispanic 0.256 0.388
Percent Asian/Pacific Islander 0.241 0.332
Income Inequality 0.194 0.149
Poverty Rate 0.073 0.244
Civilian Unemployment Rate 0.438 0.880
Violent Crimes per 100,000 Population 0.953 0.531
Home Ownership Rate 0.254 0.344
Ln(Median Mortgage) 0.546 0.368
South 0.015 0.068
Pacific 0.030 0.045
Ln(Total Population/1000) 0.578 0.260
Number of Communities 0.736 0.712
Number of Obs. 8322 6858
Notes: In addition to race (white (omitted category), black, hispanic, and asian), the 
regressions also include controls for education, years of service, and rank.
Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics for Installation-Level 
and Community-Level Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev.
Installation-Level Mean Characteristics
    Percent White 0.598 0.084
    Racial Relations Good 0.580 0.082
    Social Presciptions 19.018 0.827
Community-Level Characteristics 
Racial/Ethnic Diversity
    Percent White 0.652 0.160
    Percent Black 0.245 0.150
    Percent Asian/Pacific Islander 0.070 0.159
    Percent Other 0.033 0.041
Economic Vulnerability
    Income Inequality 0.673 0.172
    Poverty Rate 0.146 0.044
    Civilian Unemployment Rate 0.091 0.030
Crime^
    Violent Crimes per 100,000 Population 624.578 453.700
Housing Market
    Home Ownership Rate 0.403 0.076
    Ln(Median Mortgage) 6.532 0.396
Social Context
    South 0.698 0.459
    Pacific 0.144 0.351
    Ln(Total Population/1000) 3.969 1.145
    Number of Communities 8.449 12.528
Number of Observations 6,858
Notes: Sampling weights used.  ^ Measured at the county level.
Appendix Table 3. Summary Statistics for Individual Characteristics by Race
White Black Hispanic Asian
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Family Situtation
    Married 0.670 0.470 0.657 0.475 0.692 0.462 0.572 0.495
    Mixed Marriage 0.087 0.282 0.120 0.325 0.264 0.441 0.320 0.467
    Presence of Kids 0.461 0.499 0.588 0.492 0.547 0.498 0.458 0.498
Education
    College 0.274 0.446 0.119 0.324 0.130 0.336 0.322 0.467
Female 0.111 0.314 0.261 0.440 0.114 0.317 0.185 0.388
Years of Active Service
   6 or less 0.521 0.500 0.397 0.489 0.510 0.500 0.550 0.498
Officer 0.253 0.435 0.088 0.283 0.104 0.305 0.259 0.438
Lives Off-Base 0.490 0.500 0.488 0.500 0.460 0.499 0.478 0.500
Number of Observations 1,547 2,214 1,888 1,209
Notes: Sampling weights used.  Standard deviation in parentheses.
